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Habermas's recent  book, Between Facts and Norms, engages 
c u r r e n t  d i  scussions i n Anglo-American po l  i t i c a l  theory--especi a1 l y  
concerning t h e  na ture  and i i m i  t s  of  1 i bera l  democracy--more 
e x t e n s i v e l y  than any o f  h i s  e a r l i e r  work. '  I t  should thus be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  form an i n i t i a l  judgment about how h i s  "discourse 
t h e o r y  o f  law" and conception o f  "procedura l  democracy'' might f a r e  
when confronted by some o f  t h e  more press ing  issues  i n  l i b e r a l  
p o l i t i c a l  theory.  I n  these d iscuss ions  t h r e e  issues  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s tand ou t :  F i r s t ,  t he re  i s  a  longstanding debate about t h e  
re1  a t i  on between democracy and o t h e r  p o l  i t i c a l  i d e a l  s  (such as 
p o l i t i c a l  equa l i t y ,  t h e  r u l e  o f  law, and t h e  guarantee of bas ic  
r i g h t s  and 1 i b e r t i  es) . Are these p o l  i ti c a l  va l  ues i n deep conf 1  i c t  
w i t h  t h e  i d e a l  o f  democracy, o r  can they  be reconc i l ed  w i t h  one . . _ 
'.C. . , 
another i n  a  more general i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  d e m ~ c r a c y ? ~  Second, 
t h e r e  has been a lengthy d i scuss ion  about t h e  idea1 o f  l i b e r a l  
n e ~ t r a l i t y . ~  Is, t h e  c la im  t h a t  t h e  l i b e r a l  s t a t e  should no t  a c t  
i n ways i ntended t o  promote a p a r t i  cu l 'ar  concept ion.  of t h e  good 
d e f e n s i b l e  when, on t h e  one hand, t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  d i s t i n c t  
c u l t u r e s  and 1 i fe- forms are  i ncreas i  n g l y  threatened by g lobal  
markets and, on t h e  other,  t h e  e t h i c a l  foundat ions o f  l i b e r a l  
s o c i e t y  a re  being ca1 l e d  i n t o  ques t i on  by non-1 i bera l  regimes? 
Thi  rd ,  as an extension o f  t h e  c r i t i q u e  o f  n e u t r a l  i t y ,  t h e  "dilemma 
o f  d i f f e r e n c e "  (Minow) poses a d i s t i n c t  chal lenge t o  l i b e r a l  
ideo logy :  Must any attempt t o  address "d i f f e rence"  under t h e  
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1 i bera l  idea: s  of equal i t y ,  i rnpart i  a! i t y ,  and t o i  e r a t i  on 
necessar i l y  perpe tua te  i n j u s t i c e s  and do v i o l e n c e  t o  those 
ca tegor ies  and c lasses  not  t r a d i t i o n a l  1  y  recogni  zed 2s w i  t h i  n  t h e  
norm? Th is  i ssue has been r a i  sed p a r t i  cu1 a r l y  (though no t  
exclusive!y)  i n  recent  f e m i n i s t  ju r i sprudence. '  A f t e r  b r i e f l y  
rev iewing some o f  t h e  main f e a t u r e s  of Habermas's procedura l  
democracy, I w i  11 r e t u r n  t o  these t h r e e  issues t o  cons ider  how they 
mi-ght be addressed- f rom w i  t h i  n  t h e  pe rspec t i ve  o f  h i s  d i  scourse 
theory.  
W i th in  t h e  con tex t  o f  Nor th American d iscuss ions ,  Habermas's 
use o f  t h e  phrase "procedura l  democracy" cou ld  be mis lead ing  s ince  
i t  d i f f e r s  from t h e  c o n t r a s t  between procedura l  and subs tan t i ve  
democracy found, f o r  example, i n  John E l y ' s  account i n  Democracv 
and D i s t r u s t  o r  i n  i n  B r i a n  B a r r y ' s  i n f l u e n t i a l  essay, " I s  
Democracy Specia l?" .  Barry  w r i t e s :  "I f o l l o w  . . . those who ' . ,.. . .. 
i n s i s t  t h a t  'democracy' i s  t o  be understood i n  p rocedura l  terms. 
That i s  t o  say, I r e j e c t  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  one should b u i l d  i n t o  
'democracy1 any c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  conten t  o f  outcomes produced, 
such as subs tan t i ve  e q u a l i t y ,  respect  f o r  human r i g h t s ;  concern f o r  
t h e  general we l fa re ,  personal l i b e r t y  and t h e  r u l e  o f  law. 115 
Habermas's model i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  procedura l  i n  t h i  s  'sense s i  nce i t  
draws upon t h e  i d e a l s  o f  1  i b e r t y  and e q u a l i t y  imp1 i c i t  i n  t h e  idea 
o f  communicative reason (see 323, 123, and 537). I t  presupposes as 
an element of p r a c t i c a l  reason an i d e a l  o f  c i t i z e n  ' s  autonomy t h a t  
should be r e f l e c t e d  i n  an i n s t i  t u t i  onal des i  gn i n c o r p o r a t i n g  




t o  what Char? es Bei t z  r e f e r s  t o  as "compl ex procedirra? i sm" wbi ch 
ho lds  t h a t  " .  . . t h e  terms o f  democrat ic p a r t i c i p a t i o n  are f a i r  
whn they  are reasonably acceptable from each c i t i z e n ' s  po in t  o f  
view, or more p rec i  se l y ,  when no c i t i z e n  has good reason t o  re fuse 
t o  accept them. '" Habermas's procedura l  i sm may a1 so be compared 
t o  what has been c a l l e d  a " p u b l i c  reasons" approach. According t o  
t h i s  approach, found i n  t h e  work o f  John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, 
Samuel Freeman and o thers ,  democratic norms and procedures are sa id  
t o  be based on reasons t h a t  c i t i z e n s  can publ i c l y  a f f i r m  i n  view o f  
a concept ion o f  themselves as f r e e  and equal persons.' 
Habermas i ntroduces h i  s concept ion o f  procedural democracy by 
way o f  a c o n t r a s t  between two h i  gh l  y'-sty1 i zed a1 t e r n a t i  ves : 
1 i b e r a l  and republ i can ( o r  communi t a r i  an). These have become 
fami 1 i a r  re ference p o i  n t s  i n recent  . d i  scussi ons. Cass Sunstei n, 
f o r  exampl e, has recent1 y summari zed t h e  1 i bera l  model we1 1 : . . 
" S e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  n o t  v i r t u e ,  i s  understood t o  be the  usual 
m o t i v a t i n g  f o r c e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  behav io r .  P o l i t i c s  i s  t y p i c a l l y ,  i f  
n o t  always, an e f f o r t  t o  aggregate p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s .  It i s  
surrounded by checks., i n  t h e  form o f  r i g h t s ,  p r o t e c t i n g  p r i v a t e  
1 i b e r t y  and p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  from publ  i c i n t r u s i  onn .' By cont ras t ,  
republ  i cani sm charac te r i  s t i  c a l l  y p laces  more emphasi s on the  va l  ue 
o f  c i  t i zensl publ i c v i  r t u e s  and a c t i v e  p o l  i ti c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
Po1 i t i c s  i s  viewed as a d e l i b e r a t i v e  process i n  which c i t i z e n s  seek 
t o  reach agreement about t h e  common good, and law i s  not  seen 
s o l e l y  as a means f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  b u t  as an 
'expression o f  t h e  common p r a x i s  o f  t h e  po l  i t i c a l  community. 
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Habermas's p rocedura l  democracy attempts t o  i nco rpo ra te  t h e  
best  fea tures  of  bo th  models w h i l e  avoid ing t h e  shortcomings o f  
each. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i t h  t h e  repub l ican  model, i t  r e j e c t s  t h e  
v i s i o n  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process as p r i m a r i l y  a  process o f  
compet i t ion  and aggregat ion o f  p r i v a t e  preferences.  However, more 
i n  keeping w i t h  t h e  1  i b e r a l  model, i t  regards t h e  repub l ican  v i s i o n  
o f  a  c i t i  zenry u n i t e d  and a c t i v e l y  mot ivated by a  shared concept ion 
o f  t h e  good l i f e  as i n a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  modern, p l u r a l i s t  soc ie t i es . '  
S i  nce p o l  i ti c a l  d i  scourses i nvolve bargai  n i  ng and negot i  a t i  on as 
we1 1  as moral argumentat ion,  t h e  republ  i can o r  communi t a r i  an n o t i o n  
o f  a  shared e t h i c a l - p o l  i t i c a l  d ia logue a l so  seems t o o  l i m i t e d  
(347).  "Discourse t h e o r y  has t h e  success o f  de l  i b e r a t i  ve po l  i ti cs 
.depend n o t  on a  c o l l e c t i v e l y  a c t i n g  c i t i z e n r y  b u t  on t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  corresponding procedures and c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  communication, as w e l l  as on t h e  i n t e r p l a y  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  . ' . .  . .x.- .; .. 
d e l i b e r a t i v e  processes w i t h  i n f o r m a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  p u b l i c  
op in ions."  (361-2) Thus, what i s  c e n t r a l  i s  n o t  a shared ethos, 
b u t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  discourses f o r  t h e  fo rmat ion  o f  r a t i o n a l  
p o l  i t i c a l  op in ion .  
The idea o f  a  s u i t a b l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  " d e l i b e r a t i v e  p o l  i t i  cs" 
thus  l i e s  a t  t h e  c o r e  o f  Habermas's procedural  democracy. I n  a  
d e l i b e r a t i v e  p o l i t i c s  a t t e n t i o n  s h i f t s  away from t h e  f i n a l  a c t  of 
v o t i n g  and t h e  problems o f  s o c i a l  cho ice  t h a t  accompany i t  ."' The 
mode1 at tempts t o  t a k e  s e r i o u s l y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o f ten  enough 
preferences are n o t  exogenous t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system, b u t  "are 
i ns tead  adapt ive t o  a  wide range o f  f a c t o r s - - i  nc lud ing  t h e  contex t  
I. 
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i n  which t h e  preference i s  expreksed, the  e x i s t i n g  l e g a l  r u l e s ,  
p a s t  consumption choices,  and c u l t u r e  i n  genera l " . "  The aim o f  
a  d e l i b e r a t i v e  p o l i t i c s  i s  t o  p rov ide  a contex t  f o r  t h e  poss ib le  
t r a n s f o r m a t i  on o f  preferences i n  'response t o  the  considered views 
o f  o the rs  and t h e  "launder; ng" o r  f i  1  t e r i  ng of i r r a t i o n a l  and/or 
m o r a l l y  repugnant preferences i n  a  manner t h a t  i s  not  excess ive ly  
pa te rna l  i s t i c . "  For example, by desi gni ng i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
p o l  i t i c a l  w i  1  l - fo rmat ion  so t h a t  they r e f l e c t  t h e  more complex 
pre ference s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  r a t h e r  than s imply  r e g i s t e r  t h e  
a c t u a l  p re fe rences  i n d i v i d u a l s  have a t  any g iven t ime, t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  more r a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  ( t h a t  i s ,  a  p o l i t i c a l  
process i n  which t h e  outcomes are  more informed, fu tu re-or ien ted ,  
. . 
and o the r - rega rd i  ng) can be improved.13 One cou ld  even speak o f  
an ex tens ion  o f  democracy t o  preferences themselves s ince  t h e  
ques t i on  i s  whether t h e  reasons o f fe red  i n  support  o f  them a re  ones . ' - .  = . , 
t h a t  cou ld  meet t h e  requi  rements o f  publ  i c  j u s t i  f i c a t i  on .I4 What 
i s  impor tan t  f o r  t h i s  n o t i o n  of d e l i  bera t ion ,  however, i s  l e s s  t h a t  
everyone p a r t i  c i  pate--or even t h a t  v o t i  ng be made publ  i c--than t h a t  
t h e r e  be a  warranted presumption t h a t  pub1 i c  op in ion  .be formed on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  adequate in fo rmat ion  and re levan t  reasons and t h a t  
those whose i n t e r e s t s  are i nvo l ved  have an equal and e f f e c t i v e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  make t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  (and t h e  reasons f o r  them) 
known. 
Two f u r t h e r  fea tu res  serve t o  d i  s t i  ngui sh Habermas's model o f  
procedu'ral democracy and de l  i b e r a t i v e  po l  i ti cs from o the r  recent 
vers ions .  F i  r s t ,  t h i  s  vers ion o f  de1 i b e r a t i  ve p o l  i t i c s  extends 
t 
beyond t h e  formal l y -o rgan i  zed ps1 i t i c a l  system t o  t h e  v a s t  and 
compl ex communi c a t  i on network t h a t  Habermas c a l l  s  " the  publ  i c 
sphere". 
[Del i b e r a t i  ve p o l  i t i c s ]  i s  bound t o  t h e  demandi ng 
communi c a t i  ve presupposi t i ons o f  po l  i ti c a l  arenas t h a t  do 
no t  co inc ide  w i t h  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  w i  11- format ion i n  
p a r l  i amentary bodi  es but extend equa l ly  t o  t h e  p o l  i t i  ca1 
p u b l i c  sphere and t o  i t s  c u l t u r a l  con tex t  and s o c i a l  
basi  s.  A del i b e r a t i  ve p r a c t i c e  o f  se l  f -de termi  n a t i o n  can 
develop on ly  i n  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between, on t h e  one hand, 
t h e  p a r l  iamentary w i  11-format ion i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  i n  
1  egal procedures and programmed t o  reach dec i  s i  ons and, 
on t h e  o ther ,  p o l i t i c a l  op in ion-bui  I d i n g  i n  i n f o r m a l  
c i  r c 1  es o f  po l  i t i  c a l  communi c a t i o n .  (334) 
The model suggests a  " two-track" process i n  which t h e r e  i s  a  
d i  v i  s i  on o f  labor  between "weak pub1 i cs"-- the i nformal  1y o rgan i  zed 
p u b l i c  sphere ranging from p r i v a t e  assoc ia t ions  t o  t h e  mass media 
1  ocated i n " c i  v i  1  soc i  etyW--and "s t rong  publ i csft--par1 i amentary 
bodies and o ther  formal ly -organized i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
15 system. I n  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  of l abo r ,  "weak p u b l i c s "  assume a ..> - 
. ,. . . 
c e n t r a l  responsi b i  1  i t y  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  and i n t e r p r e t i n g  soc i  a1 
problems: "For a  good p a r t  o f  t h e  normat ive expec ta t i ons  connected 
w i t h  d e l i b e r a t i v e  p o l  i t i c s  now fa1  1  s  on t h e  p e r i p h e r a l  s t r u c t u r e s  
o f  op i  n i  on-formati on. The expectat ions a r e  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  
capac i t y  t o  perce ive,  i nte rp re t ,  and present encompassi ng soc i  a1 
problems i n  a  way b o t h  a t ten t i on -ca tch i  ng and i nnova t i  ve. (434) 
However, decision-maki ng responsi b i  1  i t y ,  as we1 1  as t h e  f u r t h e r  
"f i 1 t e r i  ng" o f  reasons v i  a  more formal p a r l  i amentary procedures, 
remains t h e  task  of a  s t rong p u b l i c  (e .g. ,  t h e  fo rma l l y -o rgan ized  
p o l  i ti c a l  system). 
Second, a!ong w i t h  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r  between s t rong  and 
weak p u b l i c s  and as a consequence of h i s  increased acknowledgment 
of t h e  "decentered" charac ter  o f  modern s o c i e t i e s ,  Habermas argues 
t h a t  r a d i  ca1 -democratic p r a c t i  ce must assume a "se l  f - 1  i m i  t i  ng" 
form. Democrat izat ion i s  now focussed no t  on soc ie ty  as a whole, 
b u t ' o n  t h e  l e g a l  system broad ly  conceived (370 ) .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  he 
mainta ins,  i t  must respect  t he  boundar ies of t h e  p o l i t i c a l -  
admi n i  s t r a t i  ve and economic subsystems t h a t  have become r e l a t i v e l y  
f reed  from t h e  i n t e g r a t i v e  f o r c e  o f  communicative a c t i o n  and are  i n  
t h i s  sense "autonomous". F a i l u r e  t o  do so, he be l ieves ,  a t  l e a s t  
p a r t i a l l y  exp la ins  the  f a i l u r e  o f  s t a t e  s ~ c i a l i s m . ' ~  The goal of 
rad i  c a l  democracy thus becomes not t h e  democratic organi  z a t i  on o f  
these subsystems, b u t  r a t h e r  a type  of i n d i  r e c t '  s t e e r i n g  o f  them 
through t h e  medium o f  law. I n  t h i s  connect ion,  he a l s o  descr ibes 
the  t a s k  o f  an opin ion- formi  ng pub1 i c sphere as t h a t  o f  l a y i n g  ' . . = . .  . - 
. . ... 
s iege t o  t h e  formal 1y-organi zed po l  i ti ca1 system by enci  r c 1  i ng i t 
w i t h  reasons w i thout ,  however, a t tempt i  ng t o  overthrow o r  rep1 ace 
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Th i s  r a i s e s  a number o f  d i f f i c u l t  quest ions about t h e  scope 
and 1 i m i  t s  of  democrati z a t i o n  . Given t h e  f requent  metaphori ca l  
character  of h i s  d iscuss ion  (see, e.g., t h e  references t o  
l l ~ ~ l o n i  z a t i  on", "sieges" , and " s l u i  ces")  , i t  i s no t  c l e a r  what 
speci f i c proposal  s f o r  medi a t i  ng between weak and s t rong  pub1 i c s  
would fo l l ow  from h i s  model. Some have questioned, f o r  example, 
whether' he has no t  conceded.too much t o  systems theory  and Nancy 
Fraser , i n an i nst ' ruct  i ve d i  scussi on o f  Habermas s concept i  on o f  
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t h e  p u b l i c  sphere, r a i s e s  t h e  ques t ion  whether t h e r e  might  no t  be  
o ther  poss ib le  ! 'di v i  s i  ons o f  1 abor" between s t r o n g  and weak 
pub1 i cs.  Habermas's response, I t h i n k ,  would be t h a t  an answer 
t o  these quest ions w i  11 no t  be found a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  normat ive 
theory,  bu t  depends upon t h e  empi r i  c a l  f i nd i  ngs o f  cornpl ex 
comparati ve s tud ies .  However, a  more general ques t i on  t h a t  
a r i s e s  i n  connect ion w i t h  t h i s  model o f  democracy i s  whether 
Habermas's confidence i n  t h e  r a t i o n a l  i z i n g  e f f e c t  o f  procedures 
alone i s  well- founded. I n  view o f  h i s  own d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  "weak 
pub1 i c s "  as " w i  I d " ,  "anarch ic" ,  and " u n r e s t r i c t e d "  (374), t h e  
suspic ion can a t  1  eas t  be r a i  sed whether d i s c u r s i v e  procedures , w i  11 
s u f f i c e  t o  b r i n g  about a  r a t i o n a l  pub1 i c  op in ion .  To be sure, he 
s t a t e s  t h a t  a  de l  i b e r a t  i ve po l  i ti cs  depends on a  " r a t i  ona1 i zed 
l i f e w o r l d "  ( i n c l u d i n g  a  "1 i b e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e " )  " t h a t  meets i t  
h a l f ~ a y " . ' ~  But w i t h o u t  more a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  " l i b e r a l  
0 -  - 
v i r t u e s "  t h a t  make up t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  and g i v e  r i s e  t o  some 
n o t i o n  o f  shared purposes, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  n o t  t o  empathize w i t h  
Sheldon Wol i n ' s  obse rva t i on  concerning t h e  recent  p o l  i ti cs o f  
d i f f e r e n c e .  Desc r ib ing  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o f  someone who wants t o  have 
h i s  c l a i m  t o  c u l t u r a l  exc lus iveness recognized w h i l e  a t  t h e  same 
t ime  r e s i s t i n g  any th ing  more than minima1 i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  
po l  i ti c a l  community, Wol i n  exposes a  d i  s t u r b i  ng paradox w i  t h i  n  i t :  
I want t o  be bound o n l y  by a  weak and a t tenuated  bond of 
i nc lus ion ,  y e t  my demands presuppose a  s t rong  Sta te ,  one 
capable o f  p r o t e c t i n g  me i n  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  r a c i s t  and 
v i  01 en t  soc i  e t y  and ass i  s t i  ng me amidst i ncreas i  ng1 y  
uncer ta in  economic prospect's. A s o c i e t y  w i t h  a  
mu1 t i tude o f  organized, v igorous, and se l f -consc ious  
d i f f e rences  produces no t  a  s t rong  S t a t e  b u t  an e r r a t i c  
one t h a t  i s  capable o f  reck less  m i  1  i t a r y  adventures 
abroad and p a r t i  san, a r b i  t r & y  ac t i ons  a t  home. . . yet  
i s  reduced t o  impotence when at tempt ing t o  remedy 
s t r u c t u r a l  i n j u s t i c e s  o r  t o  engage i n  long-range p lanning 
i n mat ters  such as educat ion,  envi ronmental p r o t e c t i  on, 
r a c i  a1 re1 a t i  ons, and economic s t r a t e g i  es. '' 
Habermas no doubt shares some of these same concerns about t h e  
cond i t i ons  necessary f o r  mai n t a i  n i  ng a 1 i bera l  po l  i t i  ca1 c u l t u r e ,  
and h i s  own focus on t h e  more a b s t r a c t  form o f  mutual recogn i t i on  
a t  t h e  bas is  o f  a l e g a l  community may make t h e  requi.rements f o r  
i n c l  u s i  on 1 ess demandi ng than Wol i n suggests. The quest ion 
never the l  ess remai ns whether Habermas's almost exc l  u s i  ve a t t e n t i  on 
t o  quest ions o f  i n s t i  t u t i  ona1 design and d i  scurs ive  procedures 
o f f e r s  an adequate b a s i s  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h i s  paradox o r  whether 
he must no t  supplement h i s  model w i t h  a more s p e c i f i c  account o f  
t h e  "1 i bera l  v i  r t u e s "  o r  " e t h i c a l  foundat ions" t h a t  must "meet 
these ha1 fway" . 2' 
I would now 1 i ke t o  consider  how Habermas's theory  ' fares w i t h  . , ,  .- - 
. . ..< ', 
' C  
respect t o  t h e  t h r e e  issues  noted i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n :  t h e  p r o j e c t  
o f  reconci  1 i a t i  on, t h e  ques t i  on o f  1 i bera l  n e u t r a l  i t y ,  and t h e  
d i  1 emma o f  d i  f f erence. 
(1) I n  Chapter Three o f  Between Facts and Norms Habermas 
in t roduces  a novel  a t tempt  t o  reconci  le t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  democracy 
(o r  popular sovere ign ty )  w i t h  a system o f  bas i c  r i g h t s .  H is  c la im  
i s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  should be seen as subord inate t o  t h e  o the r  (as i s  
general 1 y t h e  case i n b o t h  republ  i cani  sm and c1 ass i  c a l  1 i bera l  ism) , 
. . bu t  t h a t  t hey  a r e  . " equ ip r imord ia l "  . o r  "co-or i  g i  na l  " 
(ell e i c h u r s ~ r i i n q l  ich) (1 55) and " rec ip roca l  l y  e x p l a i n  each o the r .  
-(123) The system o f  r i g h t s  i s  t h e  "reverse s ide"  (123) o f  t h e  
. ,I 
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p r i n c i p l e  of democracy, and " t h e  ' p r i n c i p l e  o f  democracy can on ly  
appear a t h e  hear t  o f  a system o f  r i g h t s . "  (155) 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  Habermas's c l a i m  i s  t h a t  t h e  system o f  
r i g h t s  (a long w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of democracy) can be developed 
f rom t h e  " i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n "  (Verschrankunq) o f  t he  d iscourse  
p r i n c i p l e  and t h e  l e g a l  form (154) .  As I understand i t ,  t h i s  
"derivation"--Habermas speaks o f  a " l o g i c a l  genesis" ( l o q i  sche 
Genese)-- of  a system of r i g h t s  occurs i n  two stages: F i r s t ,  t h e  
n o t i o n  o f  law cannot be l i m i  t e d  t o  t h e  semantic features o f  general  
and a b s t r a c t  norms. Rather ,  bourgeois formal law has always been 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  guarantee of an equal r i g h t  t o  s u b j e c t i v e  
1 i b e r t y  . *' Th i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  Kant 's  Universa l  P r i n c i p l e  o f  
R igh t  (Recht) as w e l l  as Rawls's F i r s t  P r i n c i p l e  bo th  o f  which 
guarantee t h e  g r e a t e s t  amount o f  l i b e r t y  compatible w i t h  a li ke 
l i b e r t y  f o r  a1 1. For Habermas t h i s  l i n k  between p o s i t i v e  1 aw and . .. 
' .I 
i n d i  v idua l  1 i b e r t y  means t h a t  i nsofar  as i nd i  v i  dual s undertake t o  
r e g u l a t e  t h e i  r common 1 i f e  through t h e  l e g a l  form they must do so 
i n  a way t h a t  g ran ts  t o  each member an equal r i g h t  t o  l i b e r t y .  
However--and t h i s  i s  t h e  second step--although t h e  l e g a l  form 
i s  conceptua l l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  i dea  o f  s u b j e c t i v e  r i g h t s ,  i t  alone 
.cannot  ground any s p e c i f i c  r i g h t  (162) .  A system o f  r i g h t s  can be 
developed o n l y  if and when t h e  l e g a l  form i s  made use o f  by  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  sovereign i n  an exerc ise  o f  t h e  c i t i z e n s '  p u b l i c  
autonomy. T h i s  p u b l i c  autonomy i n  t h e  l a s t  ana lys i s  r e f e r s  back t o  
t h e  d iscourse p r i n c i p l e  which imp1 i e s  t h e  " r i g h t "  t o  submit o n l y  t o  
those norms one cou ld  agree t o  i n  a discourse. O f  course, i n  
connectior! w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  'discourse t h i s  " r i g h t "  has on ly  
t h e  "quasi - t ranscendenta l "  s ta tus  o f  a  communicative a c t  and does 
no t  c a r r y  w i t h  i t  any coerc ive  au tho r i za t i on .  I t  can acqui re a  
coe rc i ve  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  o n l y  when, as t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of democracy, i t  
i s  r e a l i z e d  i n  t h e  l e g a l  medium together  w i t h  a system of r i g h t s .  
The p r i n c i p l e  o f  d iscourse can assume through t h e  medium 
of law t h e  shape of a  p r i n c i p l e  of democracy o n l y  i n s o f a r  
as the  d iscourse  p r i n c i p l e  and the  l e g a l  medium 
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e  and devel OR i n t o  a  system o f  r i  ghts 
b r i n g i n g  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  autonomy i n t o  a  r e l a t i o n  o f  
mutual p resuppos i t i on .  Conversely, every exe rc i  se o f  
po l  i t i c a l  autonomy s i  gni f i es bo th  an i n t e r p r e t a t . i  on and 
concrete shaping of these fundamentally 'unsatura ted '  
r i g h t s  by a  h i s t o r i c a l  law-g iver .  (162) 
Habermas hopes i n  t h i s  way t o  have reconc i led  democracy and 
i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  i n  a  manner t h a t  does not  subord inate e i t h e r  one 
t o  t h e  o ther .  "The system of r i g h t s  can be reduced n e i t h e r  t o  a  
moral reading o f  human r i g h t s  [as i n  Kant and t h e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
n a t u r a l  r i g h t s  J nor  t o  an e t h i c a l  reading o f  popu lar  sovere ignty  . . - ,  
. ..>.'*' .; . 
[as i n  Rousseau and some cornmunitarians] because t h e  p r i v a t e  
autonomy o f  c i t i z e n s  must n e i t h e r  be se t  above nor made subordinate 
t o  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  autonomy." (134) Rather, t h e  c o - o r i g i  na l  i t y  o r  
"equ ip r imord ia l  i t y "  o f  t h e  system o f  r i g h t s  and t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
democracy, which a1 so r e f  1  ec ts  t h e  mutual p resuppos i t ion  o f  
c i t i z e n s '  pub1 i c  and p r i v a t e  autonomy, i s  d e r i v e d  from t h i s  
" i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n "  of t h e  1  egal form and t h e  "quasi - t ranscendental  " 
d iscourse p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  "must'8 occur if c i t i z e n s  a r e  t o  regu la te  
t h e i r  l i v i n g  toge the r  by means o f  p o s i t i v e  law. 
s ince  Habermas c la ims t h a t  no one e l se  has y e t  succeeded i n  
t h i s  p r o j e c t  o f  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  (Ill), i t  may be u s e f u l  t o  c o n t r a s t  
* 
h i s  owr! p o s i t i o n  with two other  recent  a t tempts.  I n  Democracv and 
I t s  C r i t i c s  Robert Dahl recognizes t h e  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  between 
a  "p rocedura l "  democracy and a  "subs tan t ive"  se t  of bas i c  r i g h t s  
and at tempts t o  reso lve  i t  by a rgu ing  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s e l f -  
government through t h e  democratic process i s  bas i c  and t h a t  o the r  
p o l  i t i c a l  r i g h t s  can be der ived  from t h i s  fundamental r i g h t  ." 
These speci f i c  r i  ghts--1 e t  me c a l l  them p r i  marv po l  i t i c a l  
r i q h t s - - a r e  i n t e g r a l  t o  t h e  democratic process. They 
aren ' t  onto1 og i  c a l l  y  separate f rom--or p r i  o r  t o ,  o r  
super io r  to - - the  democratic process. To t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  
t h e  democratic process e x i s t s  i n  a  p o l i t i c a l  system, a l l  
t h e  pr imary p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  must a l s o  e x i s t .  To t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  pr imary p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  a re  absent fcom a  
system, t h e  democratic process does n o t  e x i s t . 2 4  
T h i s  s t r a t e g y  faces two se r ious  ob jec t i ons .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  n o t  
c l e a r  whether o ther  "non-pol i t i c a l "  r i g h t s  can be accounted f o r  i n  
a  s i m i l a r  manner and, even if so, whether t h i s  would no t  amount t o  
an i nstrumenta l  i z a t i  on o f  p r i v a t e  autonomy f o r  t h e  sake o f  pub1 i c  
autonomy. Second, a1 though i t  i s  a  "substant ive' !  no t  "procedura l  " ,_ 
accocnt,  Dahl I s  s t r a t e g y  s u f f e r s  from a  r e l i a n c e  on an 
"aggregat ive"  conception of democracy t h a t  i s  i n  t h e  end s i m i  1ar  t o  
E l  y  ' s  procedura l  concept ion r e f e r r e d  t o  above. Thi  s  i s  suggested, 
f o r  example, i n  h i s  endorsement of a  f a i r l y  u t i l i t a r i a n  read ing  o f  
t h e  " p r i n c i p l e  o f  equal cons ide ra t i on  o f  i n t e r e s t s f 1  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  
t h e  autonomy-based concept i  on i mpl i c i  t i n  Habermas ' s  account.  25 
I n  a  recent  essay, Ronald Dworkin has a l s o  at tempted t o  
' r e c o n c i l e  democracy and bas i c  r i g h t s . 2 6  He begins w i t h  E l y ' s  
obse rva t i on  t h a t  many of t h e  " d i s a b l i n g   provision^^^ o f  t h e  U. S. 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( roughly  t h e  B i l l  o f  R igh ts )  may be seen as 
" f u n c t i o n a l  l y  s t r u c t u r a l "  t o  t h e  democratic process and t h u s  n o t  i n  
1 4  
communal concept i  or!, democracy anb s o n s t i  t u t i  ona1 c o n s t r a i  n t  a rs  
no t  antagoni s t s  but  p a r t n e r s  i n p r i  n c i  p1 e".  3 C 
Dworki n ' s  model i s  c l e a r l y  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  aggregat ive 
concept ions.  The t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s  appeal d i  r e c t l y  t o  t h e  i d e a l s  o f  
autonomy and mutual recogn i t i on ,  and t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  democracy (as 
w e l l  as law) i n  connect ion w i t h  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  a  community's 
p r a c t i c e s  and a t t i t u d e s  p o i n t s  away from a  metaphysical or  
s u b s t a n t i a l i s t  concept ion o f  community. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, as he 
recogni  zes, h i  s  " p r i  n c i  p l  e  of stake" th rea tens  t o  become a  "black 
ho le  i n t o  which' a1 1  o the r  p o l i t i c a l  v i r t u e s  c011apse."~'  His 
response, however, which i s  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  requi  res 
no t  t h a t  each c i t i z e n  be shown equal concern b u t  o n l y  t h a t  there  
e x i s t  a  "good f a i t h  e f f o r t , "  t h rea tens  t o  undermine t h e  p u b l i c  
autonomy o f  c i  t i  zens. 
Habermas ' s  proposal  , by c o n t r a s t ,  reconci  1 es popular 
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sovere ign ty  and human r i g h t s  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  pub1 i c  and p r i v a t e  
autonomy a r e  s a i d  mu tua l l y  t o  presuppose one another.  A v i r t u e  o f  
t h e  mode1 i s  t h a t  i t  r e l a t e s  these i d e a l s  a t  an a b s t r a c t  l e v e l  : 
Pub1 i c and p r i v a t e  autonomy a re  two dimensions o f  t he .  fundamental 
" r i g h t "  . t o  communicative 1  i b e r t y  as t h i s  i s  expressed i n  t h e  l e g a l  
form. I f  one begins w i t h  t h i s  n o t i o n  o f  communicative l i b e r t y ,  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  regard t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  as a  s o r t  o f  "pub l i c  
c h a r t e r "  and t h e  system o f  r i g h t s  as a  form o f  "precommitment" t h a t  
c i ' t izens make i n  under tak ing t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e i r  common l . i ves  by 
pub1 i c  law." As such t h e  proposed reconci  1  i a t i o n  o f  democracy and 




c o n f l i c t  w i t h  i t .  The r i g h t  t o  freedom o f  expression i s  an 
example: " S i  nce democratic e l e c t i o n s  demonstrate t h e  w i  11 o f  t h e  
people on ly  when t h e  pub1 i c  i s  f u l l y  informed, p reven t ing  o f f i c i a l s  
from censor ing speech p r o t e c t s  r a t h e r  than subver ts  democracy . . 
. . So a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a !  r i g h t  of f r e e  speech counts  as f u n c t i o n a l l y  
s t r u c t u r a l  as w e l l  as d i s a b l i n g  i n  our ~ a t a l o g u e . " ~ '  However, as 
E l y  concedes, t h i s  s t ra tegy  w i  11 n o t  work f o r  a l l  t h e  " d i s a b l i n g  
p r o v i  sions1I--for example, t h e  Es tab l  i shment Clause o f  t h e  F i  r s t  
Amendment o r  r i  gh ts  t h a t  r e g u l a t e  t h e  c r i  m i  na l  process--and so, 
Dworki n  concl  udes, " E l  y  I s  rescue of democracy f rom t h e  Consti  t u t i  on 
i s  on ly  a  p a r t i a l  success".28 
Dworkin 's own response t o  t h e  "supposed c o n f l i c t  between 
democracy and a  c o n s t i t u t i o n "  (330) begins by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
between a  " s t a t i  s t i  c a l  reading o f  democracy" (i .e.,  t h e  aggregat i  ve 
concept ion r e f e r r e d  t o  above) and a  "communal read ing  o f  democracyw ' . . _._ . 
(e .  g  . , Rousseau I s  general w i  1  1  ) . 2 9  He then argues f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  
vers ion  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  which he c a l l s  "democracy as i n t e g r a t i o n " .  
Th i s  model i s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  connect ion  w i t h  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s :  t h e  
p r i  n c i  p1 e  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( requ i  r i  ng t h a t  each c i t i z e n  have an 
equal and e f f e c t i v e  oppor tun i t y  t o  make a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  
p o l  i ti c a l  process), t h e  p r i  n c i  p l e  o f  s take  ( r e q u i  r i  ng t h a t  each 
person be recognized o r  shown equal concern), and t h e  p r i  n c i  p1 e  o f  
i ndependence (speci f y i  ng t h a t  i nd i  v i  dual  s  be respons ib le  f o r  t h e i  r 
own judgments). Dworki n  then concludes t h a t  on t h i  s model many o f  
t h e  d i ' sab l ing  p rov i s ions  E l y  r e j e c t e d  may be regarded as 
f u n c t i o n a l  l y  s t r u c t u r a l  and, hence, no t  a n t i  -democrati c :  "On t h e  
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autonomy. I t  i s  no t  based on a sdared concept ion o f  t h e  good, but 
on a  more abs t rac t  form o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  contained i n  t h e  idea o f  
f r e e  and equal consociates under law. 
A t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h i s  approach may 
' a l so  prove t o  be i t s  g rea tes t  weakness. Given t h e  abs t rac t  
charac ter  of t h e  reconci  1  i a t i o n  of pub1 i c  and p r i v a t e  autonomy, i t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine how i t  might c o n t r i b u t e  t o  more s p e c i f i c  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  debates, f o r  example, rega rd i  ng t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  Establ ishment Clause o f  t he  F i r s t  Amendment, o r  t h e  more 
s p e c i f i c  scope and con ten t  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p r i vacy .  Habermas would 
probably  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  system of r i g h t s  i s  "unsaturated" and needs 
t o  be f i l l e d  i n  bo th  w i t h  re ference t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  community's 
p a r t i c u l a r  t r a d i t i o n  and h i s t o r y  and i n  response t o  ongoing 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  p u b l i c  sphere. Th is  may be so, bu t  i t  
a l s o  seems reasonable t o  expect t h a t  t h e  general proposal f o r  a  . . .  
.5 .  .. 
' '.
reconci  1  i a t i  on o f  democracy and bas ic  r i g h t s  should p rov ide  some 
guidance t o  more s p e c i f i c  debates about r i g h t s  (e.g. ,  would i t  
support  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  t o  a b o r t i o n  as a  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
secur i  ng t h e  pub1 i c  autonomy of women?). I suspect, i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  
t h e  theo ry  w i  11 be a b l e  t o  p rov ide  such guidance, b u t  much more 
work needs t o  be done i n  t h i s  "middle range" between general 
concept ions and t h e  enumerati on o f  speci  f i c  r i  ghts and 1 i b e r t i  es. 
(2 )  Despi te  h i s  emphasis on "weak pub l i cs "  and p l u r a l i s t  
c i v i l  s o c i e t y  Habermas's model o f  procedural  democracy and 
d e l i b e r a t i v e  p o l i t i c s  endorses a  " n o n r e s t r i c t i v e '  o r  " t o l e r a n t "  
ve rs ion  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of l i b e r a l  n e u t r a l i t y  (374 f f  . ) .  Th is  
p r i  n c i  p l  e has been c r i  t i  c i  zed b; communi t a r i  ans and o thers  who 
argue t h a t  i t  i s excess; v e l  y  i ndi  v i  dual i s t i  c  o r  atomi s t i  c i n  i t s  
concept ion o f  t h e  c i t i z e n  and/or t h a t  i t  presupposes i t s  own 
concept ion of t h e  good and thus  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  se l  f -defeat ;  ng ( s i n c e  
i t  cannot a1 low f o r  t h e  promot ion of values requ i red  f o r  a  1  i b e r a i  
soc i  e t y )  .33 I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  has been argued t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  1 i  b e r a l  n e u t r a l i t y  i s  n o t  compat ib le  w i t h  t h e  s t a t e 1  s  p u r s u i t  o f  
measures in tended t o  promote o r  ma in ta in  a  d i ve rse  c i v i  1  s o c i e t y  
and robus t  p u b l i c  sphere. 3 4 I s  Habermas ' s endorsement o f  a  
p r i  n c i  p1 e  o f  n e u t r a l  i t y  consi s t e n t  w i t h  h i  s  a f f  i rmat i  on o f  t h e  
va lue  o f  a  robus t  pub1 i c  sphere? 
I t  i s  impor tan t  t h a t  t h e  meaning o f  l i b e r a l  n e u t r a l i t y ,  a t  
1  eas t  on i t s  b e s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  n o t  be m i  sunderstood. F i  r s t ,  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  of n e u t r a l i t y  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  a  n e u t r a l  o r  non-moral 
p r i n c i p l e .  I t  does n o t  imp ly  a  merely procedural  n e u t r a l i t y  w i t h  ' . 
r espec t  t o  whatever concept ions o f  t h e  good l i f e  c i t i z e n s  may 
happen t o  have. Rather, i t  i s  an i d e a l  in t roduced i n  con junc t i on  
w i t h  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r i g h t  ( f o r  example, Kant 's  Universa l  P r i n c i p l e  
o f  R i g h t  o r  Rawls 's  P r i n c i p l e  of Equal L i b e r t y )  and t,hus one t h a t  
i s  b iased aga ins t  concept ions of t h e  good t h a t  a r e  incompat ib le  
w i t h  t h e  bas i c  r i g h t s  and 1  i b e r t i e s  s p e c i f i e d  by t h a t  p r i n c i p l e .  3s 
Second, t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  does no t  even r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  
s t a t e  t r e a t  equal l y  any pe rm iss ib le  concept ion o f  t h e  good c i t i z e n s  
may have o r  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c i e s  pursued by t h e  s t a t e  must have t h e  
same e f f e c t  upon any and a1 1  (pe rm iss ib le )  conceptions o f  t h e  good 
l i f e .  T h i s  form o f  n e u t r a l i t y ,  which has been c a l l e d  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  
e f f e c t  o r  consequenti a1 neutral ' i  t y ,  i s both i m p r a c t i c a l  anc! 
undesi r a b l  e .  Rather, what 1 i bera l  neut ra l  i t y  e n t a i  1s i s 
" n e u t r a l i t y  o f  aim" o r  " n e u t r a l i t y  of  grounds" i n  t h e  sense t h a t  
arguments and cons ide ra t i ons  i ntroduced i n  support o f  speci f i c .  
p r i n c i p l e s  o r  po l  i c i e s  should not appeal t o  p a r t i c u l a r  concept ions 
o f  t h e  good l i f e  b u t  should regard a l l  c i t i z e n s  and t h e i r  
(permi s s i  b l  e) concept ions w i t h  equal concern and respec t .  3 6 
Even on t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  the  p r i n c i p l e  can be contested. 
Can p o l i c i e s  be n e u t r a l  i n  t h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h i s  way, o r  must 
n o t  such claims t o  n e u t r a l i t y  i n e v i t a b l y  appeal t o  some 
(pe rm iss ib le )  concept ions o f  the  good over others? One ve rs ion  o f  
., - n e u t r a l  i t y ,  suggested by Ackerman's no t i on  o f  "const ra ined 
conversa t i  on" and Raw1 s '  s "method of avoidance", i s  suscep t ib le  t o  
t h i s  cha l lenge s ince  by unduly r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  issues t h a t  can be 
p laced on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  agenda o r  r a i  sed i n  pub1 i c  d iscuss ion  t h e r e  . ..  . - :.-r .. 
C 
. . i s  t h e  danger o f  r e i n f o r c i n g  the  s t a t u s  quo and i n h i b i t i n g  mutual 
u n d e r ~ t a n d i n g . ~ '  T h i s  s t ra tegy  a l s o  suggests t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
re1  a t i  ve1 y f i x e d  and c1 ear d i  s t i  n c t i  on between those mat ters  
app rop r ia te  fo r  p u b l i c  d iscuss ion and those t h a t  a re  .not. 
An a1 t e r n a t i  ve i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  1 i bera l  neu t ra l  i t y  i s able t o  
avo id  t h i s  ob jec t i on .  On t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
n e u t r a l i t y  i s  no t  understood as p a r t  o f  a general s t r a t e g y  o f  
avoidance, b u t  as p a r t  of what i s  requ i red  i n  showing equal concern 
and respec t  i n  a s t ronger  sense: The s t a t e  should no t  a c t  i n  ways 
in tended t o  promote a p a r t i c u l a r  concept ion o f  t h e  good 1 i f e  s ince  
t h a t  would c o n s t i t u t e  a f a i l u r e  t o  show each c i t i z e n  equal concern 
. -' , 
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and respec t .  U n l  i ke t h e  method of avoidance, t h i  s i n t e r p r e t a t i  cn 
o f  n e u t r a l i t y  does n o t  requ i  r e  keeping c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i ssues  o f f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  agenda i n  o rder  t o  avoid moral c o n f l i c t .  Rather, i t  i s  
q u i t e  cons is ten t  w i t h  t h e  view t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  a c t  i n  ways i n tended  
t o  promote r a t i  onal d i  scuss i  on i n  order  t o  he1 p  reso lve  p o t e n t i  a1 1  y 
d i  v i  s i  ve soci a1 and moral conf 1 i c t s .  38 On t h i  s  i n t e r p r e t a t i  on 
n e u t r a l i t y  i s  compat ib le  w i t h  t h e  at tempt t o  secure a  fo rm o f  
mutual respect  o r  " m i  1  i t a n t  t o l e r a t i o n "  i n  which d i f f e r e n c e  i s  n o t  
o n l y  t o l e r a t e d ,  b u t  i n  which i n d i v i d u a l s  seek t o  understand one 
another i n  t h e i  r d i f f e r e n c e s  and a r r i v e  a t  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  
a t  hand i n  view o f  t h e i r  common r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  one another as f r e e  
and equal c i t i z e n s .  
It w i l l  perhaps be ob jec ted  t h a t  t h i s  v iew leads  beyond 
1  i bera l  n e u t r a l i t y  t o  a  1  i bera l  o r  "modesttf pe r fec t i on i sm.  I n  
f a c t ,  a  s imi 1ar argument f o r  a  more robust  and p l u r a l i s t  p u b l i c  . - . -. , .- 
sphere has r e c e n t l y  been made by Michael W a l ~ e r . ~ '  As pa radox ica l  
as i t  may seem, i n  v iew o f  t h e  tremendous "normal iz ing"  e f f e c t s  o f  
t h e  market economy and bu reauc ra t i c  s t a t e  t h e r e  i s  1  i t t l e  reason t o  
assume t h a t  e i t h e r  a robus t  and p l u r a l i s t  p u b l i c  sphere o r  t h e  
o t h e r  general soci  a1 c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  more del  i b e r a t i v e  p o l  i ti c s  
can be secured w i t h o u t  t h e  ( s e l  f - r e f 1  e c t i  ve) i n t e r v e n t i o n  and 
ass is tance o f  t he  s t a t e .  However, w h i l e  I have argued t h a t  t h e  
s t a t e  may be j u s t i f i e d  i n .  a c t i n g  i n  ways t o  secure such forums, I 
do not  see t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  embracing a  p e r f e c t i o n i s t  account o f  
1 i b e r a i i  sm ra the r  than  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n e u t r a l  i t y  
o u t l i n e d  above. For, on t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  a c t i o n s  of  t h e  
s t a t e  a re  j u s t i f i e d  no t  becaus; of t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  way of l i f e  o r  concept ion o f  t h e  good, b u t  because 
robust  and p l u r a l i s t  d e l i b e r a t i v e  forums are necessary c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  exe rc i se  o f  bas i c  r i g h t s  o f  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  
autonomy. The s t a t e  may a t  t imes be j u s t i f i e d  i n  a c t i n g  i n  ways 
aimed a t  promoting o r  secur ing t h e  cond i t i ons  f o r  a  p l u r a l i s t  c i v i  1  
soc ie ty  no t  because i t  regards a  p l u r a l i s t  s o c i e t y  as a  good f o r  
i t s  c i t i z e n s ,  b u t  because i t  regards such c o n d i t i o n s  as 
requirements o f  p r a c t i c a l  reason i n  t h e  sense t h a t  in formed and 
reasonable d e l i b e r a t i o n  cou ld  no t  be achieved w i thou t  them. 
(3 )  F i n a l l y ,  issues ra i sed  i n  t h e  c r i t i q u e  o f  l i b e r a l  
n e u t r a l i t y  reemerge i n  a  heightened form i n  t h e  "dilemma o f  
d i f f e r e n c e " .  For t h e  c l a i m  i s  now t h a t  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  " j u s t i c e "  
through t h e  bourgeois l e g a l  form (e.g. general law aimed a t  t h e  
guarantee o f  equal r i g h t s )  necessari l y  devalues d i  f f e rence  and does 
v io lence  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  groups and p r a c t i c e s  which d e v i a t e  from 
the  es tab l i shed norm.40 The dilemma o f  d i f fe rence,  which has been 
most ex tens ive ly  d i  scussed i n  recent  femi n i  s t  jur isprudence,  i s  
i n e x t r i  cab1 y  entwi ned w i t h  the  fundamental p r i  n c i  p l  e  o f  1  egal 
equal i t y  . "Treat equal s  equal 1  y" requi  res  a  j udgment about t h e  
respects i n  which two t h i n g s  are equal and what i t  means t o  t r e a t  
them equa l ly .  But t h i s  g i ves  r i s e  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  dilemma: 
By t a k i  ng another person 's  d i  f ference i n t o  account i n  
awarding goods o r  d i  s t r i  b u t i  ng burdens, you r i  sk 
r e i t e r a t i n g  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e  and, 
p o t e n t i  a1 l y ,  i t s  st igma and s t e r e o t y p i  ng consequences. 
~ u t  i f  you do no t  t a k e  another person 's  d i f f e r e n c e  i n t o  
account-- in a  wor ld  t h a t  has made t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e  mat te r -  
-you may a l s o  rec rea te  and r e e s t a b l i s h  bo th  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  and i t s  negat ive  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  I f  you d r a f t  
o r  enforce laws you may wor6y t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  
laws w i  11 not be n e u t r a l  whether you take  d i f f e r e n c e  i n t o  
account or  you igno re  i t  ." 
Attempts t o  secure l e g a l  e q u a l i t y  have g e n e r a l l y  pursued 
e i t h e r  an "assimi l a t i  on i  s t  model" (which emphasi zes t h e  ex ten t  t o  
which we a r e  a1 1 a1 i ke) o r  an "accommodation model " (which seeks t o  
c rea te  "spec ia l  r i g h t s "  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  " r e a l "  d i f f e rences )  . As 
some femin i  s t s  p o i n t  ou t ,  however, b o t h  models founder upon t h e  
same problem. I n  a t tempt ing  t o  deterrni ne .which d i  f ferences deserve 
l e g a l  remedies and which should be ignored t h e  background norms 
which e s t a b l i s h  terms of  re levance and i n  l i g h t  o f  which judgments 
o f  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e  a re  made f requen t l y  go unchal lenged.42 
One response has been t o  r e s i s t  t h e  language o f  sameness and 
d i f ference a l toge the r  and pursue a c r i t i q u e  o f  law f rom t h e  p o i n t  
o f  view o f  domination instead.43 However, once t h e  problem i s  
framed i n  t h e  above manner, t h a t  i s ,  n o t  as a problem o f  judgments . . - 
.-_ . 
of sameness and d i f fe rence per se, b u t  as a c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  
under ly ing  norms and c r i t e r i a  g u i d i n g  them, a t t e n t i o n  s h i f t s  t o  t h e  
process through which those norms have been de f ined.  And here,  I 
t h i n k ,  t h e  s t reng th  o f  Habermas's approach emerges: The e f f o r t  t o  
secure equal r i g h t s  and t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  law f o r  each c i t i z e n  must 
go hand i n  hand w i t h  e f f o r t s  t o  secure t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
autonomy o f  a1 1 c i  t i  zens. Pub1 i c and p r i v a t e  autonomy mutual 1y 
suppose one another and must be j o i n t l y  r e a l i z e d  t o  secure 
processes o f  l e g i t i m a t e  lawmaking. W i th  t h i s  model i n  view, one 
cou ld  then take  up t h e  suggest ion o f  some f e m i n i s t s  t h a t  t h e  p o i n t  
i s  no t  f o r  t he  law t o  be " b l i n d "  t o  d i f f e r e n c e ,  nor t o  f i x  
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p a r t i c u l a r  d i  f fe rences  through t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  "spec ia l  
r i g h t s ,  " b u t  " t o  make d i f f e r e n c e  c o s t l e s s " .  4 4 
With respect  t o  these t h r e e  chal lenges t o  l i b e r a l  democracy, 
I conclude t h a t  t he  a b s t r a c t  and h i g h l y  procedural  character  of 
Habermas's vers ion  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  o f  r a d i c a l  democracy i s  i t s  
p r i  n c i  pa l  s t reng th  and weakness. I t s  s t r e n g t h  i s  t h a t ,  i n  
connect ion w i t h  h i s  t h e o r y  o f  communicative reason and ac t i on ,  
Habermas generates a  unique and powerfu l  argument f o r  a  model o f  
democracy i n  which t h e  pub1 i c  and p r i v a t e  autonomy o f  c i t i z e n s  are 
g iven equal cons ide ra t i  on. I t  generates an i n t e r s u b j e c t i  ve account 
o f  bas i c  r i g h t s  and a  procedura l  democracy more a t t r a c t i v e  than any 
o f  t h e  l i b e r a l  o r  repub l i can  accounts c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e .  I t a lso  
o f f e r s  a  s t r o n g  argument f o r  t h e  des ign o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  
f a c i l i t a t e  d iscuss ion  based on mutual respec t .  On t h e  o ther  hand, 
t h e  h i g h l y  abs t rac t  cha rac te r  o f  t h e  proposal  suggests t h a t  more ' . : .  - 
.:* .. 
work s t . i  11 needs t o  be done i f  i t  i s  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  d i  r e c t l v  t o  more 
s p e c i f i c  debates about b a s i c  r i g h t s ,  t h e  "d i  1  emmas o f  d i  f ference" ,  
o r  what counts as t h e  approp r ia te  correspondence ( o r  "meeting 
halfway") o f  l i b e r a l  v i r t u e  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  design t h a t ,  as 
Habermas concedes, i s  r e q u i r e d  i f  h i s  n o t i o n  o f  a  procedural 
democracy and del  i b e r a t i  ve p o l  i ti cs  i s t o  be e f f e c t i v e l y  r e a l  i zed 
i n, t h e  contemporary w o r l d  . 
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